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Political borders are relative constructs. This 
finding is neither new nor astounding. As re-
cent history has shown in Europe, tangible po-
litical borders can change – even vanish – within 
a short period of time (however, invisible borders 
in minds remain much more persistent as they 
are results of long historical processes and social 
practice).
Given those observations and taking into con-
sideration the political, economic and societal 
changes in a globalised, market-economy-dom-
inated world, it seems that borders and nation-
states are becoming less important. Certain au-
thors, such as Kenichi Omahe, even tend to argue 
that the concept of nations is being replaced by 
smaller, economically defined areas of world-
wide importance (Omahe 1995).
If this point of view is taken as a basis, the 
Korean experience with its most severe, hyper-
controlled border separating the North from the 
South must seem not only striking, but even bi-
zarre. Together with the equally inhuman border 
in Gaza, the inner Korean border occurs as a di-
nosaur amongst political boundaries worldwide.
However, the Korean example of an extremely 
closed border is not the only proof that bounda-
ries of nation-states are still powerful constructs 
(see also the Mexico-U.S. border, or the mecha-
nisms of the Schengen Area to control its outer 
border).
The Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between the 
Republic of Korea (RoK) and the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is regarded as the 
last remaining border of the Cold War (e.g. Kim 
2001). In spite of this, there have been enormous 
changes in the North-South Korean relations 
since the year 2000 until the spring of 2010, when 
conditions changed totally again after a North 
Korean submarine obviously attacked and sunk 
the Cheonan, a South Korean battleship, in the 
South Korean waters.
Regarding Korean cross-border issues since 
the mid–1990s, there were several changes. First of 
all, diplomatic contact was established, generally 
enabled through a major change in South Korean 
politics called Sunshine Policy. Later, the DPRK 
opened up a little bit and allowed certain activi-
ties of international aid, NGOs as well as private 
investors. In this context, the planning and estab-
lishment of two North Korean Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ), both situated almost ”at” the bor-
der, by using massive South Korean investment 
was amongst the most striking activities. The first 
SEZ, Geumgangsan (Diamond Mountains), was 
dedicated to tourism, whilst the Gaesong Indus-
trial Complex was designed for maquila-type 
contract processing. Some hope was put into the 
idea that these very first attempts at cross-border 
cooperation might be the germ for the opening 
up of the DPRK in the future; if not even towards 
Korean unity.
Due to continuous provocations from the 
DPRK towards the Republic of Korea, all rap-
prochement activities have stopped by 2010. The 
range of problematic issues shifted from interna-
tionally noted nuclear issues to less known inci-
dents, such as the mysterious killing of a South 
Korean tourist in Geumgangsan in 2008.
On the other hand, it is a fact that the DPRK 
and the Republic of Korea have just had almost 
one decade of tangible cross-border interaction, 
with Kim Dae-Jung’s visit to Pyong-Yang in 2000 
as an official starting point and the official end in 
2010 due to the Cheonan incident.
This leads to the question of how the spatially 
manifested cross-border activities could be as-
sessed in an appropriate manner. Were both 
SEZs of Geumgangsan and Gaesong – despite the 
current tensions – successful attempts at feasi-
ble Korean cross-border cooperation, and might 
those projects still carry a germ for Korean recon-
ciliation? Putting into question the North-Korean 
point of view: How does cross-border coopera-
tion get along with a state doctrine based on self-
chosen isolation and a farthest possible autarky? 
Was the idea of establishing cross-border cooper-
ation ever a real option? Or must the above-men-
tioned rapprochement be judged as an unwilling 
but inevitable and finally temporary occurrence, 
due to the squalid economic situation of North 
Korea?
The findings in this paper are based on inten-
sive literature and newspaper analysis, on ex-
pert interviews in South Korea, and a stay in the 
Geumgangsan Special Tourist Zone in 2006.
 SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZs) ALONG THE KOREAN DEMILITARISED ZONE... 97
2. From confrontation to first cross-
border cooperation and back
Using Martinez’ (1994) classification of cross-
border relations, the Korean case is what could 
be called an “alienated borderland”. Each side 
shows a hostile, even aggressive, attitude to-
wards the other. Cross-border interactions do not 
take place or are limited to a minimum. Although 
a similar situation was in Central Europe with its 
Iron Curtain from the early 1960s until 1989, in 
real life cross-border relations – particularly with 
regard to economic activities – had been rather 
intense.
So it was quite surprising when the South Ko-
rean Sunshine Policy of peace and mutual under-
standing was officially established in 2000. The 
Republic of Korea became an important partner 
of human-aid, trade and commercial investments 
to the DPRK for almost one decade.
In political terms, Sunshine Policy is based on 
peaceful cooperation and seeks reconciliation, 
with a potential for Korean reunification. It is 
founded on three principles:
zero tolerance for aggression and provoca- –
tions from the North,
no intention of unification through absorption  –
of the North by the South,
taking measures to enhance reconciliation and  –
mutual exchange by the South, including the 
separation of political cooperation from eco-
nomic cooperation.
The South Korean government held the view 
that Kim Jong-Il’s regime was not going to col-
lapse in the near future (despite its severe eco-
nomic problems, and not even after the leader’s 
decease).
Keeping in mind that the U.S. has currently 
about 28,000-strong troops in South Korea and 
the Republic of Korea’s military counts another 
655,000 men (and of late also some women) fac-
ing an estimated 1.1 million or more in the North, 
aggression cannot be a future-oriented strategy, 
indeed. Another argument stresses historical 
experience. In view of the failed U.S. policy con-
cerning the regimes in Cuba, Libya, Afghanistan 
or Iraq, aggressive approaches do not seem to be 
very efficient anyway.
Against this background, it was argued that 
bilateral tensions could only be reduced by a pol-
icy of mutual reconciliation, trust and normali-
sation of political and economic relations. Sun-
shine Policy has been strongly influenced by the 
experiences of the German unification. On the 
one hand, Brandt’s Ostpolitik of a peaceful rap-
prochement serves as an example that a similar 
process could soothe the tension and eventually 
lead towards Korean unity. On the other hand, 
regarding the enormous efforts of the German 
unification, it was concluded that absorption of 
the North cannot be a feasible strategy anyway. 
The expected costs and further ramifications of 
a reunification after a DPRK breakdown would 
be far beyond the ability of South Korea’s econ-
omy to handle. Instead, a strategy of preventing 
such a situation by stabilising the North ”before-
hand” has been developed. Thus, the Republic of 
Korea engaged in humanitarian aid and loosened 
its restrictions on the private sector’s investment 
in North Korea. One should not forget that before 
Sunshine Policy started, cross-border interaction 
was illegal and unwanted in both Korean states. 
The improvement of bilateral relations should 
encourage political and economic reforms with 
a successive opening up of the border. In the very 
end, the major goal was a so-called ”soft-landing” 
of the North society and economy, without the 
urgent need of external aid to enable the survival 
of the North Korean people. But – so ran the idea 
– if North Korea’s economy might improve, this 
might also induce political reforms and change. 
Then, maybe further thoughts on Korean unity or 
a Korean confederation could be appropriate.
The Sunshine Policy idea was first articu-
lated in 1998 and implemented by former South 
Korean president Kim Dae-Jung, who was also 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for this 
new leitmotiv.
In this respect, one important detail should not 
be forgotten. The basic impulse for Sunshine Pol-
icy is strongly related to the founder and leader 
of the Korean industrial conglomerate (chaebol) 
Hyundai, Chung Ju-Yung. Chung was born in to-
day’s North Korea. As a Korean patriot, the idea 
of reunification was one of his basic beliefs for 
lifetime. Hence, on learning about North Korea’s 
most shocking famine in the mid–1990s, he was 
looking for contact with the DPRK leaders (by-
passing official diplomatic restrictions) in order 
to offer assistance and help. Chung was finally al-
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lowed to send 500 head of cattle over the Demili-
tarised Zone as a symbol of reconciliation and 
compassion as well as real relief to the starving 
North. Immediately Chung Ju-Yung held – suc-
cessful – informal negotiations on cross-border 
issues, such as the establishment of a Geumgang-
san (Diamond Mountains) special tourist zone to 
attract South Koreans on a day-trip basis.
Later it was revealed that the whole process, 
from the first unofficial contact to the formal 
meeting of the presidents in Pyong Yang in 2000, 
was accompanied by the payment of enormous 
bungs in hard currency to the DPRK’s notoriously 
broke regime. Nevertheless, Chung’s individual 
commitment was probably the elementary condi-
tion for the Sunshine Policy proclaimed later by 
the South Korean government.
Despite the very ”physical” closed border, the 
implementation of a SEZ in the DPRK with South 
Korean partners could almost serve as an argu-
ment for Kenichi Omahe’s expected “end of the 
nation-state”. “Put simply, in terms of real flows 
of economic activity, nation-states have already 
lost their role as meaningful units of participa-
tion in the global economy of today’s borderless 
world” (Omahe 1995: 11). Not the government, 
but business was able to put down the barrier in 
Korea, at least to a certain extent. The “nation-
states” themselves proved to be incapable of such 
an achievement. But this kind of explanation is 
certainly somewhat bold, as Chung was not only 
following capitalist interests but also driven by 
very individual feelings and patriotism.
After at least some constructive dialogue had 
been established, a kind of reunification euphoria 
came up in the South, which was squared by the 
DPRK’s kind of friendly attitude. In the media 
and official statements, critical opinions about 
the Northern regime and its supposed atrocities 
towards people almost vanished.
The first significant tension occurred when 
the U.S. labelled North Korea as part of the “Axis 
of Evil“. Talks with the South were temporar-
ily suspended. In 2002 military aggression over 
a disputed fishing territory chilled down the rela-
tions even more. Four South Korean sailors were 
killed.
However, South Korea’s president Roh Moo-
Hyun continued the policy of his predecessor 
Kim Dae-Jung in principle. The relations on the 
divided peninsula became a little better again. In 
2003, when the possession of nuclear weapons by 
the North became an issue and its further semi- 
and illegal activities were revealed (such as the 
counterfeiting of American money or not settling 
international invoices), the Korean dialogue suf-
fered another setback.
Earlier that year the South Korean policy to-
wards North Korea had to be reconsidered as 
details of the so called cash-for-summit scandal 
were uncovered. As it turned out, a secret pay-
ment of millions of dollars by the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to the DPRK ensured the organi-
sation of the famous summit in 2000 where Kim 
Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il met (Kirk 2003). This 
money transfer was managed by the private 
company Hyundai Asan, holding the monopoly 
for developing and managing the Geumgangsan 
Special Tourist Zone and the Gaesong Special 
Economic Industrial Zone. As a consequence of 
the scandal, Chung Mong-Hun, the Chairman of 
Hyundai Asan and son of the Hyundai founder 
Chung Ju-Yung, committed suicide.
Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea contin-
ued its humanitarian aid for the North and main-
tained close cooperation concerning the Geum-
gangsan Special Tourist Area and the Gaesong 
Industrial Park.
South Korea stayed with a policy of de-esca-
lation and reconciliation despite the notoriously 
unpredictable and somewhat intractable behav-
iour of the DPRK regime concerning internation-
al affairs as well as the Korean dialogue. How-
ever, the leitmotiv was slightly changed from the 
optimistic Sunshine Policy towards a much more 
cautious motto called ”a policy of peace and 
prosperity”.
The internationally noted and potentially 
threatening nuclear and missile tests of the DPRK 
army finally led to a stop of South Korean aid in 
October 2006. This turnaround was regarded as 
most overdue by sceptics of any form of Sun-
shine Policy. The ”friendly approach” was main-
ly criticised for helping the notoriously hostile 
and threatening Northern regime to survive even 
longer instead of promoting reforms and mutual 
understanding.
It became even more obvious that all North 
Korean agreements did not involve a real shift in 
politics, but were directly connected to the deso-
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late state of the DPRK economy, which forced the 
regime to welcome any source of currency which 
could guarantee its survival. Furthermore, some 
critics feared that Sunshine Policy could weaken 
the relations between the U.S.A. and the Repub-
lic of Korea. It was argued that concerns of the 
North must not be favoured and put over the in-
terests of the United States, as this ally is of vital 
importance for South Korea.
Discussion followed about what the future pol-
icy towards the DPRK should be, as provocations 
seemed to be a persistent issue, whatever friend-
ly measures originated from the South. Thus, in 
2008 the newly elected president Lee Myung-Bak 
announced a toughening of the RoK’s stance to-
wards the DPRK and stopped foodstuff supply 
as long as North Korea followed a nuclear pro-
gramme. Reactions from Pyong Yang were rather 
fierce although Lee sought closer economic coop-
eration despite the above-mentioned, more criti-
cal and strict approach in other fields of politics.
Anyway, from a geographical point of view, 
the design, construction and implementation of 
the Geumgangsan Special Tourist Zone in 1999 
and the Special-Economic Zone in Gaesong, also 
called the Gaesong Industrial Complex (GIC), in 
2002, were still the most outstanding, tangible 
and surprising achievements in matters of cross-
border cooperation. This statement is true de-
spite the fact that each special economic enclave 
is separated from the rest of the DPRK by fences 
and military control points.
As for the Geumgangsan Tourist Area, activi-
ties were stopped when a South Korean tourist 
was shot to death by North Korean military in 
March 2008 (Reuters online 2008). Since North 
Korean officials refused further investigations de-
manded by South Korea and mutual allegations 
of provocation or espionage made the round, no 
more Geumgangsan trips were offered by tour 
operators. 
Soon after, in 2009, the Gaesong Industrial 
Park became subject to further tension. First, 
a South Korean citizen was arrested and accused 
of anti-DPRK propaganda. Later that year all con-
tracts and agreements of this SEZ were cancelled 
unilaterally by the North-Korean regime (Süd-
deutsche Zeitung online, 15 May 2009). Although 
further negotiations could prevent the initially 
announced changes from being applied, the 
North Korean side had lost credibility. But trust 
and reliability are basic features of any successful 
undertaking (e.g. Lorenz 1992), not only in capi-
talist societies. This is certainly true for successful 
cross-border cooperation as well (Kortelainen & 
Köppen 2009).
The rock bottom in North-South relations was 
finally achieved when a South-Korean battleship 
(the Cheonan) was allegedly attacked and sunk in 
South Korean maritime territory by a North Kor-
ean submarine, killing 46 sailors (Reuters online, 
22 May 2010).
In consequence, the Lee administration offi-
cially froze all remaining (trade) activities with 
the DPRK and also called the UN, whilst in North 
Korea troops were put on red alert, announcing 
readiness to answer any further accusations and 
actions by the South with military operations 
(Spiegel online, 25 May 2010). The Gaesong Indus-
trial Complex was also subject to announcements 
of retribution and some South Korean citizens 
were expulsed, but astoundingly, production 
still seems to be going on as a matter of fact (Kim 
2010).
At this point all steps towards a better Korean 
dialogue and common project cooperation were 
stopped and taken back (see also the North Ko-
rean statement at Reuters online, http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64O3YU20100525). 
Currently the tension between the DPRK and the 
Republic of Korea seems to be worse than ever 
since the ending of the Korean War.
Surprisingly, in September 2010 the Work-
ers’ Party of Korea held a conference concerning 
also questions of leadership in the North. “The 
Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee 
decides to convene early in September, Juche 99 
(2010) a conference of the WPK for electing its 
highest leading body reflecting the new require-
ments of the WPK and the developing revolution 
in which decisive changes are taking place in the 
efforts to accomplish the revolutionary cause of 
Juche, the cause of building a prosperous and 
powerful socialist nation.” (http://www.kcna.
co.jp/index-e.htm). Indeed, during this event 
a son of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un, and the dicta-
tor’s sister were promoted to the rank of a gen-
eral, which also means that Jong Un has to be re-
garded as the ”official” successor of his father as 
the nation’s leader. Such a change also bears the 
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slight chance for revitalising the Korean dialogue 
and maybe a revival of the SEZs, but currently 
there seem to be no signs of a significant change 
in this matter in North Korean politics (see also 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010–09/
Parteitag-Nordkorea-China).
3. Special Economic Zones 
in communist North Korea?
The establishment or even the concept of spe-
cial economic zones in the DPRK, considered an 
extreme Stalinist-style socialist dictatorship, is 
surprising. Nonetheless, North Korea already 
had relevant concepts and experiences even be-
fore Sunshine Policy led to the Geumgangsan 
and Gaesong projects (Fig. 1).
The process started in the 1980s when the 
DPRK introduced a joint venture law to attract 
Western capital. “In the early 1990s, when the 
breakdown of the socialist bloc led to […] eco-
nomic difficulties, attempts to attract foreign in-
vestors were increased, however, again with not 
much success. In December 1991 at last Korea es-
tablished a SEZ in the Rajin-Sombong area, about 
the region adjacent to Russia and China. […] Tax 
incentives, a guarantee for profit repatriation and 
the custom-free import and export of raw materi-
als, intermediate products as well as products re-
lated to the industrial production of the SEZ were 
among the special features of the SEZ” (Seliger 
2006: 98). Due to a lack of appropriate infrastruc-
ture, its peripheral position as well as a lack of 
transparency and economic freedom, the project 
more or less failed (Dege 1995; Seliger 2006).
Similar to Chinese SEZs – which certainly 
have served as an inspiration – the main goals 
of the North Korean projects are the attraction of 
foreign capital, accumulation of foreign reserves, 
technology transfer, and the learning of new 
management techniques. Spill-over effects lead-
ing to a re-animation of the North Korean econo-
my in general are another important aspect. The 
open conflict between the ideology, political and 
economic goals is obvious, yet almost invincible. 
In terms of returns on investment3, North Korean 
expectations were high. In the end they proved 
to be quite unrealistic (Seliger 2006). Potential in-
vestors were finally scared off by wages higher 
than in Chinese SEZs or vietnamese factories 
whilst productivity and the real qualifications of 
North Korean workers remained unclear. Not to 
mention a certain lack of trust towards the North 
Korean authorities as partners, making any in-
vestment a very risky deal.
The early years of the Kim Dae-Jung admin-
istration marked a turning point. “[…] Sunshine 
Policy towards the North was characterized by 
offers for talks, cooperation and economic aid. In 
the preparatory stage for the 2000 summit […], 
North Korea began cooperating with the Hy-
undai conglomerate (chaebol). The showcase of 
this cooperation was the opening of the Geum-
gang Mountains and the shipping line to these 
mountains dear to Koreans on both sides of the 
border. This opening was purchased with a guar-
anteed monthly payment of millions of US dol-
lars. In other fields, Hyundai bought exclusive 
economic rights – for up to US$ 500 million. In 
2000, Hyundai received a 30-year exclusive (mo-
nopoly) contract for the railway linkage between 
North and South, the telecommunication sector 
and energy, the enlargement of Tongcheon air-
port, the dam building project at the Imjim river, 
the further expansion of the Geumgang Moun-
tains project, as well as the establishment of the 
special industrial zone on Gaesong in 2002. The 
establishment of special industrial complexes 
with South Korean chaebol was seen as a fast 
lane to modernization of the collapsed economy” 
(Seliger 2006: 99).
The year 2002 is crucial to the DPRK’s policy 
of SEZs: the Geumgangsan Special Tourist Zone 
was established formally and the Gaesong Indus-
trial Complex was agreed upon.
In the same year, North Korea announced the 
opening of a Special Economic Zone at the Chi-
nese border, in Sinuiji (Kim 2003, Lee 2003). The 
Sinuiji project was influenced by the Hong-Kong 
model and should have a special legal status for 
3 One should not forget that all investment in infra-
structure, new housing and manufacturing plants is 
made by foreign partners. The DPRK provides the 
land, cheap labour, and has probably some increased 
costs on military supervision.
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a period of fifty years. A special administrative 
status with own legislation was to allow private 
property, a separate monetary and customs sys-
tem as well as an unrestricted movement of capi-
tal and further capitalist features. Furthermore, 
a part of the idea was the resettlement of tens of 
thousands of people in order to guarantee a loyal 
and ”useful” population within this exclusive 
capitalist enclave (there are reports that at least 
the first campaign of resettlement has already 
started). The most particular characteristic of 
Sinuiji was the above-mentioned idea to establish 
not only a SEZ, but a hermetically closed Special 
Administrative Zone with a completely different 
economic and political system than in the rest 
of the DPRK. Despite this radical approach, the 
Sinuiji Special Administrative Region project was 
not recognised internationally.
Chinese-Dutch entrepreneur Yang Bin (who is 
said to be one of the richest people in China ac-
cording to the Forbes rating) was foreseen to be 
the first governor of the Sinuiji Special Adminis-
trative Region. Soon after this became public he 
was arrested by the Chinese authorities. He was 
accused and found guilty of tax fraud amongst 
other offences. As there was already an existing 
special economic zone on the Chinese side of the 
border, in the nearby city of Dandong, Yang Bin’s 
imprisonment is sometimes interpreted as a re-
venge for opening an ”unfair” competition by the 
DPRK. Quite obviously Chinese decision-makers 
had not been informed about plans concerning 
the Sinuiji Special Administrative Region. All 
in all, this ambitious project could not be imple-
mented. At least no tangible results are reported, 
although this SEZ does exist somehow.
In contrast, the implementation of the Geum-
gangsan Special Tourist Zone and the Gaesong 
Industrial Complex was more successful. Here, 
the legal status and economic approach were less 
radical than those planned for the Sinuiji Special 
Administrative Region.
3.1. Geumgangsan Special Tourist Zone
As already mentioned, there is a strong rela-
tion between Sunshine Policy, the implementa-
tion of the special zones, and the South Korean 
tycoon, Chung Ju-Yung, founder of the Hyundai 
chaebol.
When reports of starvation and the economic 
disaster in North Korea became internationally 
known in the 1990s, Chung – who was born in the 
Gaesong region in North Korea – took the initia-
tive by sending 500 cows to the DPRK in 1998 (the 
cattle was send through Panmunjom; they called 
the later “unification cows”). He met Kim Jong-Il 
four times and finally got an agreement for open-
ing the Geumgang (Diamond Mountains) range, 
directly located at the DMZ, for tourist trips.
Further steps were taken by the developing 
company Hyundai Asan, a spin-off of the Hy-
undai chaebol, which also played a major role in 
the Gaesong Industrial Park project. 
Since cross-border infrastructure and even 
legal regulations for South-North tourism were 
unclear, Hyundai Asan started trips by boat al-
ready in 1998, entering international waters be-
fore heading for Goseong harbour in the DPRK, 
as travelling a direct route between the two coun-
tries was in principle illegal (even later, regula-
tions stayed very strict). Meanwhile new tourist 
Fig. 1. The Korean Peninsula, DMZ and North Korean Spe-
cial Economic Zones.
102 BERNHARD KÖPPEN
and traffic infrastructure was planned and built. 
As the Geumgangsan – Diamond Mountains – are 
not only a place of Korean mythology, but also 
one of the best known mountain ranges of North 
Korea, facilities for mass tourism already existed, 
but needed renovation and did not always meet 
the desired standard as well as expected capaci-
ties by the optimistic Hyundai Asan developing 
company.
Just before offering direct bus trips on an ex-
clusively agreed land route from the South to 
the North, the designated tourist zone was sepa-
rated from the rest of the North Korean Goseong 
County in 2002. Fences and omnipresent military 
guards are set up along all roads travelled by 
tourist buses (Photo 1).
In order to somehow save the regime’s face, 
considering the mendacious character of such 
a capitalist project to be undertaken by the North 
Korean authorities, officially Hyundai Asan was 
hired to develop and manage the tourist zone on 
behalf of the DPRK. On the other hand, the com-
pany has to pay a monthly fee of about US$ 12 
million to North Korea (Seliger 2006) in order to 
be permitted to run its business.
Although one million visitors were counted 
by June 2005, the project did not meet the eco-
nomic expectations. Hyundai Asan faced major 
problems. Reportedly the company faced bank-
ruptcy due to its enormous investment and low 
returns. Despite massive financial aid given by 
the South Korean government, even the monthly 
fee could not be paid any more at a certain point 
(Seliger 2006).
As Geumgangsan is a highly important sym-
bol for South Korean policy, finally a state-owned 
Korean National Tourist Organisation (KNTO) 
joined in to save the project. Thus, from that mo-
ment, all expenditures were secured and backed 
up by South Korean taxpayers through state sub-
sidies for Hyundai Asan. Eventually even a fur-
ther expansion of the site (including a golf course, 
ski-facilities, etc.) was planned before the area 
was closed down in 2008 for political reasons.
Within the zone, two major branches of facili-
ties (mainly hotels and restaurants) had been es-
tablished: Southern, ”Hyundai” ones and North 
Korean enterprises. To visit the latter, hard cur-
rency had to be changed into coupons. In order 
to ensure a Southern standard in the quality of 
Hyundai-run facilities, they were supplied with 
their own electricity, food and goods. Therefore 
a power plant, greenhouses and even a mineral-
water factory had been set up in situ. Further 
goods were regularly brought in from the South 
(e.g. building materials).
As a consequence, all the North Korean fa-
cilities (restaurants, hotels) and – certainly – the 
fenced off, nearby villages and towns suffered 
from a lack of infrastructure and goods. The most 
obvious signs of this situation were frequent in-
terruptions of electric power supply in the North 
Korean facilities and the city of Goseong, which 
was not accessible but in sight (or sometimes 
not, during nighttimes). No such problems faced 
directly the Hyundai buildings. The difference 
between the Hyundai-maintained infrastructure 
and the North Korean standard was clearly vis-
ible and harsh.
Besides, a three-class human-resources system 
was used to run and build the area. North Kore-
an citizens could be found as personnel in all the 
”own-run” facilities. Also surveillance and ”se-
curity” by a permanent control of tourist excur-
sions was visibly handled by the DPRK authori-
ties. Any other citizens not directly involved in 
the tourist business were not allowed to enter the 
fenced tourist zone. Contact with foreigners was 
absolutely not intended, probably even forbid-
den. Ethnic Koreans from China were employed 
by Hyundai Asan for most labour-intensive jobs 
of low responsibility, from service to construc-
tion. They were neither allowed to enter South 
Korea nor to exit the Special Tourist zone, but 
Photo 1. North Korean military maintaining the inner fences 
of the Geumgangsan Special Tourist Zone (2006).
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functioned as classical seasonal workers. Key po-
sitions as well as high-responsibility tourist serv-
ices were held and provided by South Koreans.
As a consequence, the Geumgangsan Special 
Tourist Zone showed a unique and bizarre mix-
ture of perfectly organised mass tourism in an 
area completely controlled by an omnipresent, 
conspicuous North Korean military apparatus 
and secret service/ political police.
Apart from that, there was no indication 
that the Special Tourist Zone did initiate tangi-
ble reforms in the DPRK. However, there were 
surprising attempts at grass-roots cooperation 
by local politicians from the South Korean part 
of Goseong Gun (county). The idea was to get 
the North Korean Goseong county – where the 
Diamond Mountains are located – involved into 
agricultural projects. This initiative seemed to be 
somehow tolerated by the authorities, at least as 
long as it stayed at the level of discussion.
The gradually worsening political relations 
did not omit Geumgangsan. Whilst Hyundai 
Asan was trying to offer more trips and built new 
attractions, the North Korean missile launching 
and nuclear test in 2006 damaged not only the 
inter-Korean dialogue. About 40% of tourists 
who had already booked finally cancelled their 
planned trip in that year (Kim 2007). 
As has already been mentioned, all activities 
came to a sudden, indefinite end in 2008 when 
a South Korean tourist was shot by North Kore-
an border guards. Hyundai Asan suspended its 
trips.
It is quite interesting that – after more than 
a year – this boycott does worry the North Ko-
rean authorities in the end. Geumgangsan trips 
were seemingly of some significance as a source 
of (legal) hard currency.
In May 2010 the state news agency KCNA an-
nounced “extraordinary measures” unless tour-
ist trips are continued again. In a first step, five 
South Korean properties have been seized, as 
a measure of compensation for the damage the 
North suffered due to the suspension of the tours 
since 2008. “The five facilities to be seized include 
a fire station, a duty-free shop and a Red-Cross-
built centre to host family reunions. The official 
said the properties would be returned to state 
possession or “handed over to new businessmen 
according to legal procedures”. All remaining as-
sets will also be frozen and South Korean person-
nel expelled from the resort, said KCNA.” (BBC 
news online, 25 May 2010; http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8639065.stm).
Since mid–2010 a China based startup, 
Young Pioneer Tours, has obviously tried to of-
fer Geumgangsan trips through the Northern 
side with permission of the North Korean au-
thorities (http://www.youngpioneertours.com/
shownews.php?ID=18, last access 5 July 2010).
3.2. Gaesong Industrial Zone
During the summit of June 15, 2000, not only 
tourist business in Geumgangsan was agreed on, 
but also the establishment of a Special Economic 
Zone near Gaesong, a border town in proximity 
to the DMZ and just about 80 km north of the 
South Korean capital Seoul. The basic idea was to 
plant a germ for future positive North-South eco-
nomic relations and establishing a potential re-
gional hub for low-cost manufacturing for South 
Korean and international enterprises. As for the 
DPRK, this Industrial Park had been regarded as 
a fast lane to a modernisation and revitalisation 
of the collapsed North Korean economy (Yoon 
1999). This mixture of political motives, such as 
patriotism and the desire to reduce the costs of 
eventual unification through aiding the North 
now, together with economic motives seems 
quite unique.
The leading South Korean partner was – again 
– Hyundai Asan with a monopoly contract. very 
early, the (South) Korean Land Corporation 
(KLC or KOLAND), a governmental agency ac-
quiring, managing, developing and supplying 
land, entered the project. KOLAND gave finan-
cial guarantees to the DPRK in order to support 
Hyundai Asan in case of (financial) problems. 
This was due to the experience of Geumgangsan, 
were economic problems endangered the whole 
project. And as was the case in Geumgangsan, 
the new activity of Hyundai Asan was backed up 
by South Korean tax payers. “The South Korean 
government seems to be willing to cover up to 
fifty percent of the losses of ventures in Gaesong 
through the so-called Inter-Korean Cooperation 
Fund, a fund operated by the South Korean Ex-
port-Import bank of Korea, which amounted to 
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4.26 trillion won (US$ 3.6 billion) at the end of 
2003. So, the risk of investing in Gaesong [is] con-
siderably reduced” (Seliger 2006).
Officially, the promotion of Inter-Korean 
economic cooperation in the framework of the 
Gaesong Industrial Complex development 
should contribute to easing military tension, 
bringing stability and peace to the Korean Pe-
ninsula, as well as resolving the North Korean 
nuclear issue (White book; Korean Ministry of 
Unification). However, most criticism points out 
that the project was merely a way for large South 
Korean companies to employ extremely cheap 
labour, and a reliable source of hard currency for 
the bankrupt North Korean regime. 
Location was an important issue as the project 
area is connected to the Republic of Korea via 
a land-based transportation route (street and rail). 
Due to its proximity to the border and the capital 
region of Seoul, even energy can be produced in 
the South and transmitted to Gaesong avoiding 
dependence on poor North Korean facilities. 
The Industrial Complex was formed in 2002 
and became operational in the end of 2004. In 
2005, the project reached a stage when produc-
tion of goods in the first plants had started. Most 
official bulletins see Gaesong as a ”win-win” 
project, as it is designed to combine the capital 
and technology of South Korea with the land and 
workforce from the North.
Initially, within the Special Economic Zone 
freedom of persons and freedom to use commu-
nication systems (post, fax, the Internet) were 
guaranteed. There was no import and export tax, 
and land could be leased for up to 50 years. 
About 6,000 North Koreans worked under 
South Korean direction, producing pots, foot-
wear, textiles and other goods primarily for the 
Southern market (Salmon 2006). The number of 
South Korean specialists was about 600.
But the final plans for Gaesong went much 
further: a complete new city for a population of 
more than 300,000 was to be built (Ryu 2007). The 
old Gaesong city itself was envisaged as a cul-
tural tourism zone, attracting the history-hungry 
citizens of Seoul with the world’s largest extant 
collection of Korean traditional architecture 
(Salmon 2006). The benchmark already for 2010 
was to host 300 export-oriented South Korean 
SMEs employing 100,000 North Koreans (Erling 
2007). Even more ambitious were further plans. 
In 2020 a total of 2,000 enterprises and 200,000 
workers was foreseen. Other reports mentioned 
the idea of expanding the site to 6,610 hectares 
by 2012 and developing it into a regional manu-
facturing hub, marrying Southern capital and ex-
pertise with the skills of up to 700,000 Northern 
labourers (Ryu 2007). 
Reality proved to be less exciting. Major ob-
stacles occurred already during the very short 
period of work in Gaesong. First, the labour costs 
of US$ 80–100/month initially assumed by North 
Korea proved rather too high. Only after reduc-
ing them to US$ 50/month did Gaesong become 
competitive with such places as vietnam (where 
US$ 50 to 60 are paid) or China (where US$ 50 
to 100 are common wages). Secondly, the work-
ers themselves did not really benefit, since wages 
were not paid in US$ or Euro (although this was 
agreed upon). Thirdly, U.S. economic sanctions 
against the North caused another problem as 
imports of key technologies and sophisticated 
goods are prohibited. Furthermore, the U.S. ac-
cused the DPRK of having spent the wages for 
maintaining its programme for weapons of mass 
destruction, an allegation rejected by the South 
Korean Ministry of Reunification by pointing out 
that about 74% of the pay-offs had been actually 
used for purchasing “necessities”. This means the 
money was used to buy foodstuff which was dis-
tributed in Gaesong. Meanwhile also South Ko-
rean managers started to complain about certain 
conditions. They demanded a more direct and 
autonomous management with less control and 
limited possibilities of intervention by the North 
Korean authorities. Also North Korean workers 
were obviously not always sufficiently educated 
and trained (although an opposite statement can 
be found in the South Korean media as well) (Ryu 
2007).
Whilst the Gaesong Industrial Complex is 
a well-promoted figurehead of South Korea’s 
policy for peace, understanding and economic 
development, the DPRK obviously did not ad-
vertise the project too much. On entering the 
Special Economic Zone from the North, there 
was no sign, no evidence that this place even ex-
ists (Erling 2007). Even the internationally noted 
propagandistic train that ran across the border in 
2007 as a starting event for a regular cargo serv-
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ice from South Korea to Gaesong and back (Jung 
2007) had been kept secret by the North Korean 
regime from its own population as far as possible. 
There were neither reports nor official statements 
about that event in the national or local media of 
the DPRK (Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung 2007).
At an individual level, a more and more re-
laxed atmosphere between North Korean em-
ployees and the few South Korean managers 
was reported. On the other hand, “The contrast 
between the complex, with its modern buildings, 
utility poles and street lighting – even a lawn – 
and its surroundings is striking. Beyond the 8.6 
km green perimeter fence, soldiers patrol. Against 
one section of fence is a drab village. The grey 
concrete of the shabby houses, set amid plots of 
brown dust, is cracked and crumbling. Many of 
their windows, lacking glass, are filled instead 
with sheet plastic. Officials of the complex say 
they have assisted local villagers with heating 
briquettes and rice, but there is otherwise nei-
ther trade nor contact across the fence, indicating 
that the experience of capitalism is strictly insu-
lated. This assumption is buttressed by relations 
inside the complex: despite talk of inter-Korean 
fraternity, social contact between Northern and 
Southern workers is non-existent. “It is absolute-
ly impossible to socialize; it is prohibited by the 
authorities,” said Yoo Nam-yeol, a South Korean 
production manager at Taesang Hata, a firm pro-
ducing cosmetics containers” (Salmon 2006).
When North Korea cancelled all contracts uni-
laterally in 2009 and announced plans to more 
than triple the salaries of its approximately 40,000 
workers in Gaesong (from about US$ 75 to 400), 
Hyundai Asan and KOLAND were finally able 
to agree on much less dramatic changes and kept 
operations going (see also news24.com, 11 June 
2009).
All in all, the Gaesong Industrial Complex does 
not seem to be such a success as was claimed by 
most media, Hyundai Asan and government of-
ficials (Salmon 2006, Kim 2007). After the DPRK 
reneged on all contracts in 2009 and closed down 
as a reaction to the Cheonan affair in 2010, its fu-
ture remains unclear. On the one hand, the SEZ 
is used to blackmailing the South Korean side. 
On the other, the end of the Gaesong Industrial 
Complex is nothing North Korea’s regime could 
cope with easily.
What seems to be true for Geumgangsan 
quite obviously can be observed in Gaesong too: 
although the SEZ is somehow misused as ”hos-
tage” in the current confrontation, the DPRK 
fears a total break-off by the South. Maybe the 
experience of Geumgangsan with an unexpect-
edly consistent attitude by the tour operators 
made the regime cautious about really losing this 
source of income. There are reports that despite 
the officially announced expulsion of South Ko-
rean personnel in May 2010, operation continues 
almost as usual. “However, despite their rheto-
ric, the North Korean military authorities granted 
entrance to the Kaesong Complex for South Ko-
rean personnel this morning. Movement into and 
out of the Kaesong Complex is continuing nor-
mally, while fixed-line telephones connecting the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex and parent corpora-
tions in South Korea are operating without any 
problems, too. This appears to display North Ko-
rea’s underlying desire to continue operating the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex even while warn-
ing that “all communications between South and 
North are severed” (Kim 2010, NK daily online).
4. How to assess dPRK’s unpredictable 
policy?
North Korea’s politics are somewhat incom-
prehensible and unpredictable to others. ”Gener-
ous” gestures by the South can lead to dialogue 
and then be followed by sheer provocation such 
as missile tests or the breach of contractual obliga-
tions. Often, news from North Korea is not good 
news. North Korea keeps causing surprise. Kim 
Jong-Il is labelled a madman, his policy seems 
absurd. But the idea that Kim Jong-Il and his re-
gime is an example of an insane (army-) posse is 
quite improbable. If this were the case, the coun-
try would have broken down a long time ago. 
Despite continued famine and economic disaster, 
the regime has been in power for decades and has 
even imposed some of its will on the internation-
al community. The DPRK is not a failing state, as 
is sometimes supposed. It might be a state with 
an incredibly brutal regime based on a self-made 
quasi-religious ideology perverting some tradi-
tions rooted in Confucianism (Maretzki 1991), 
but it is a working, still functioning state.
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The DPRK’s role in world policy is marked 
by high caution, maximum self-sufficiency and 
a notoriously hostile attitude towards any ”oth-
er”. This is not so surprising, as the North Ko-
rean variation of communism, the Juche ideology, 
is based on the paradigm of total self-reliance 
and self-sufficiency. Under the rule of Kim Jong-
Il, a pro army policy called Songun (army first) 
was added to Juche, giving absolute priority to 
military concerns and viewpoints. These two ba-
sic factors should be kept in mind when trying 
to understand North Korean politics; also in the 
context of cross-border interaction and reconcili-
ation with the Republic of Korea.
However, in view of the principles of Juche and 
Songun and the fact that North Korea faces a more 
and more hopeless economic situation, things 
become more understandable. Piecing all – still 
few – known parameters on the DPRK’s leader 
and his inner circle together, it is very likely that 
an increasingly desperate struggle for survival is 
a major, if not the only, concern of Kim Jong Il’s 
regime. The Korean people and the international 
community are solely regarded in terms of use or 
potential danger to the North Korean elite. Any 
suspected destabilising tendency meets with an 
aggressive, pitiless response.
In international and inter-Korean affairs, 
brinkmanship seems to be the strategy of choice 
to safeguard a maximum of the regime’s inter-
ests. Just shortly before things become too pre-
carious, concessions are eventually made. But 
these concessions are taken back immediately if 
they might endanger the regime’s supremacy or 
if they are just not necessary any more to keep 
DPRK society functioning.
Some examples: About 2002 the North Korean 
price and wage system was reformed and some 
kind of small private markets were established. 
Even the possession of cell phones was allowed to 
individuals (being a very popular measure). For-
eign businessmen, namely from China, started to 
bring in more or less sophisticated trade goods. 
Along with them also came more unfiltered in-
formation from the outside world. DvD players 
and DvDs, even from South Korea, seemed to be 
owned by some people, at least in the urban cen-
tres. As a result, South Korean youth trends in 
clothing and hairstyle could be ”detected” in the 
DPRK for some time (probably seen on imported 
DvDs). Considered a potentially destabilising el-
ement to the regime, certain hairstyles were soon 
forbidden by the authorities4. Cell phones became 
illegal as well when it was realised (or maybe just 
verified what security forces had already known 
before) how important control of communication 
is in order to eliminate the danger of a forming 
opposition in the earliest stage possible. Despite 
the close surveillance of the North Korean peo-
ple, there seems to be also growing discontent, 
namely in peripheral regions, as revealed by un-
official reports of famine revolts against regime 
representatives in some remote counties. As these 
incidents were obviously uncoordinated, singu-
lar riots (also due to a lack of means of commu-
nication), they could be put down by the police 
and army easily5. Today, basically a small pri-
vate-market system still seems to exist. But even 
this kind of private economy with non-regulated 
prices was only tolerated temporarily as long as 
it was urgently needed to somehow provide bad-
ly needed consumer goods and food. Obviously, 
stricter regulations were enforced later again.
Thus, to ensure the regime’s survival, conces-
sions are made, sometimes on a temporary basis, 
even if they do not fit perfectly into the Korean 
style of communist ideology. However, the re-
gime is far from significant reforms. A flexible 
shifting from repression to concession and back 
seems to be a central, characteristic feature of the 
regime’s policy at the national as well as the in-
ternational level.
The above conjecture as to Kim Jong-Il’s poli-
cy could explain why many actions of the DPRK 
regime seem irrational and unpredictable to out-
siders whilst being logical from the point of view 
of the North Korean elites. 
From a North Korean perspective, a SEZ with 
a purely capitalist approach and even cross-
border cooperation can be tolerated if this is an 
inevitable but feasible strategy to follow the pri-
mary goal of guaranteeing the survival of the 
North Korean statehood. Hostile acts, even to-
4  Information provided in interviews on the current 
situation in the DPRK by the Seoul-based office of the 
Hanns Seidel Foundation.
5  Statements on the North Korean policy and situation 
by Bernhard Seliger, representative of the Seoul-based 
German NGO Hanns Seidel Foundation dealing with 
the question of a divided Korea and the DPRK.
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wards ”partners”, could be both in this context: 
a consistent expression of the ideological beliefs, 
or a strategy to strengthen the regime’s power 
and impose its will on other governments and 
the international community. More prosaically, it 
might be that North Korea’s reputed incalculabil-
ity in the Korean and international affairs is noth-
ing more than a result of boundless selfishness 
and hubris of the regime.
5. Illusion of cross-border cooperation 
between the two Koreas
In spite of all problems, and even the current 
tension, it must be stated that at least there was 
a Korean dialogue with tangible results. From 
a South Korean viewpoint, even the border be-
came permeable.
However, the Geumgangsan Special Tourist 
Zone and the Gaesong Industrial Complex were 
treated in a very specific way by the Northern re-
gime before using them as a platform for chore-
ographies of cross-border interaction in order to 
obtain the urgently needed hard currency. 
Both zones had a contract-based, special eco-
nomic and legal status. They were fenced off from 
the rest of the DPRK and frequented by specially 
selected (probably tested and loyal) workers. 
Whilst all development was due to investments 
from the South, the SEZs were easy to use for po-
litical blackmail by the North Korean authorities, 
given the total control and the arbitrary behav-
iour of the regime. It was not only once that the 
DPRK authorities used the SEZs as a leverage for 
pushing the South.
As to the South Korean idea of encouraging 
political reforms and changes through economic 
cooperation, it was clear from the beginning that 
such a tendency was absolutely avoided by the 
DPRK. That is why the SEZs were fenced off. 
Workers in the Gaesong Industrial Complex ba-
sically commute to the factories by bus on a daily 
basis, and information about Geumgangsan and 
Gaesong as well as further activities is suppressed 
in the official North Korean media or released if 
suitable for propaganda.
Hence, the so-called cross-border cooperation 
took place in a purpose-built buffer zone (Fig. 2). 
Not surprisingly, the extent of cross-border inte-
gration was very low.
The Special Zones are spatial entities of which 
each side had its own way of interpretation about 
what should be achieved. The range was not that 
broad anyway. Purely economic interest seem-
ingly dominated the DPRK’s and Hyundai As-
an’s motivation, whilst non-materialistic ideas of 
reconciliation and mutual understanding are the 
sphere of South Korean politics. Nevertheless, 
the South’s attempt was perceived as quite altru-
istic to a certain extent, since there was always 
distinct readiness for large concessions in order 
to get into further projects with the DPRK and re-
solve any problem or just maintain the dialogue. 
Certainly, this policy was not totally spiritual, as 
peace and stability are the most important factors 
for a capitalist, export-oriented economy. 
From a more theoretical point of view, the Spe-
cial Economic /Special Tourist Zones can also be 
classified as a result of institutional practice and 
as symbols in a discourse. Putting emphasis on 
cross-border cooperation, it must be stated first 
that cooperation is the antithesis of competition. 
The motivation to cooperate is basically to reach 
mutually agreed common goals, which cannot 
be achieved so easily (or at all) by acting alone. 
However, cooperation is not necessarily joyful. It 
may be voluntarily chosen as an option, but also 
be a necessity as a matter of fact. Keeping in mind 
that there is no evidence that the North Korean 
Fig. 2. North Korean Special Economic Zones as buffers 
preventing further integration through cross-border coop-
eration.
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government might be interested in any signifi-
cant political or economic reform, but is in urgent 
need of humanitarian aid and hard currency, the 
observed cross-border cooperation with the Re-
public of Korea was more than likely forced. In 
contrast, the official South Korean policy was an 
informed choice seeking mutual understanding 
and reconciliation instead of continued confron-
tation.
Finally, so far the Korean SEZs could be mainly 
judged as a very specific example of institutional 
and economic cross-border cooperation without 
real spill-over potential for further integration.
6. Résumé
Summing up the short history of the North 
Korean SEZs, an amazing observation is that un-
der certain circumstances it was possible to ”open 
the gate” between North and South Korea a little 
bit at all. By creating the Geumgangsan Special 
Tourist Zone and the Gaesong Industrial Com-
plex, the border was partially opened for almost 
one decade. It was even possible to think about 
new scenarios concerning the Korean future.
A fundamental knowledge of and experiences 
in cooperation with the DPRK has been gained 
by Hyundai Asan and KOLAND. Also, impor-
tant spatial infrastructure, such as roads, railways 
and border checkpoints, has been built.
Nevertheless, these positive aspects cannot 
hide the central problems of inter-Korean rela-
tions. The major paradigms of North Korean 
Juche ideology, self-sufficiency, self-reliance and 
autarky, combined with Songun, ”army first”, 
policy withstand the integrative South Korean 
politics by nature (Kim 2002/Juche 91). Cross-
border cooperation and integrative strategies for 
the border region cannot be a plausible feature 
of the actual North Korean state doctrine. The 
DPRK’s concessions were obviously no result of 
reform and political change, but the consequence 
of sheer distress. After all, it should not be forgot-
ten that the SEZs were one of the few sources of 
(legal) hard currency for the DPRK although their 
real relevance for the North Korean regime and 
economy remains unknown. But it seems more 
and more obvious that DPRK officials regret the 
suspension of Geumgangsan trips bitterly and do 
fear a similar situation for the Gaesong Industrial 
Complex. At least economic activities in this SEZ 
were carried on, even after their end had been of-
ficially announced by the North (Kim 2010).
That Gaesong Industrial Complex continues 
operations although all relations were officially 
announced to be stopped might serve as an in-
dicator of how important this Special Economic 
Zone is for North Korea. If operations were re-
ally stopped, an estimated 40,000 North Korean 
workers would be unemployed and have to be 
transferred to other, ”regular” workplaces (all 
over the country). The scenario feared by North-
ern officials is probably this: no more hard cur-
rency and the risk that some former employees 
might share their knowledge about the Gaesong 
Industrial Complex, the slightly better life there, 
and South Korea, with ordinary people in Kim’s 
realm of the desperate and the obscure.
Continued provocative acts of the DPRK to-
wards the Republic of Korea as well as the in-
ternational community have finally led to a new 
period of alienation and proved how fragile and 
vulnerable cross-border relations between the 
Korean states are. Maybe even an extremely low 
level of integration in cross-border cooperation 
would not be that problematic if it guaranteed 
– at least – some stability to the Korean penin-
sula. But at this point, the North Korean strategy 
of brinkmanship almost led to a total standstill 
in cooperation. Obviously the major challenge 
of the Northern regime is neither cross-border 
cooperation nor reconciliation, but a permanent 
struggle to feed its people facing an underdevel-
oped economy, while a maximum of disposable 
resources are channelled into the military and the 
nuclear programme. There is no evidence that 
a ”soft landing” is even thinkable for the North 
Korean economy, whether now or in the near fu-
ture.
It is impossible to predict when, or if, a revival 
of the Korean dialogue might take place. At least 
there has been talk about a new family meeting 
in Geumgangsan very recently. Also the current 
changes in the DPRK’s leading body might be 
a slight chance, as a lasting improvement in the 
permanently problematic relationship between 
the North and the South is basically dependent 
on significant changes in the North Korean para-
digms.
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